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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CECELIA WILSON and
CLARA MARTIN,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

No.
9567

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property damage
arising out of an accident when one of the plaintiffs was driving
the other's automobile on 13th West Street in Salt Lake City,
and the right rear wheel thereof crashed through a sewer
manhole lid.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and judgment
for each of the plaintiffs, defendant appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment
in its favor as a matter of law and dismissal of the action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pertinent facts leading to the filing and prosecution
of the action are as follows:
On August 20, 1961, the plaintiffs and respondents,
Cecelia Wilson and her daughter, Clara Martin, were returning
from a neighborhood grocery store in Mrs. Wilson's Ford
automobile along Arapahoe Avenue in Salt Lake City. Clara
Martin was driving and her mother, Mrs. Wilson, was sitting
in the front seat along side of her (R. 63, lines 27, 28 and 29).
When she reached 13th West, she turned north and ran over
a sanitary sewer lid about 40 feet north of the intersection
of Arapahoe Avenue and 13th West (R. 151, lines 12 and 13),
at which time the rear wheel of the car fell into the manhole
and Mrs. Martin and Mrs. Wilson suffered alleged personal
injuries and damage to the Wilson car (R. 48 and 49). (See
Exhibits P. 1, 2, 3 and 4.) There is some evidence that one
of the braces on the lid had a latent crack, which was underneath side of the lid, (R. 143, lines 16 to 26), but that the
main crack was freshly made (R. 51, lines 3 to 20 inclusive).
The respondents produced two girls, approximately 14 years
old, and a mature woman who testified that the lid had been
broken for about one week or a little more, prior to the
accident (R. 82, 85, 92, 93, 94 and 102, line 13). Salt Lake
City has 11,000 sewer lids to inspect (R. 146, 147 and 149).
Storm sewers are inspected twice per year; sanitary lids are
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inspected approximately every month (R. 149). The sewer
lid involved in this case is a sanitary sewer lid and was inspected on July 13, 1960, and found to be in a sound condition
(R. 146, 151, lines 18 to 30).
Salt Lake City had no actual knowledge or notice that the
said sewer lid was cracked or broken, nor had it any notice
that it was maintaining a hazardous condition on said street
for vehicular travel (R. 148, 151, lines 18 to 30; and 152, lines
1 to 19). The two questions raised by this appeal are whether
or not under the plaintiffs' testimony Salt Lake City had constructive notice of the broken sewer lid and the hazardous
condition it made for vehicular travel, to support a ii.nding that
it was negligent and whether or not the defendant city is
absolved from liability because it operates its sewer system
in a governmental capacity.

POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL
I. THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT.
II. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE
PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE, BECAUSE IT
OPERATES ITS SEWER SYSTEM IN A GOVERNMENTAL
CAPACITY.

ARGUMENT
I. THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT

A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT.
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The appellant contends that it was not negligent in maintaining 13th West Street in a reasonably safe condition for
vehicular traffic, and that the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses that the lid had been broken for approximately one
week is not sufficient lapse of time, considering the place
of the accident and character of the defect, to warrant a finding
that the appellant had constructive notice of such defect.
In the case of City of Phoenix v. Clem, Supreme Court
of Ariz., May 26, 1925, 28 Ariz. 315, 237 P. 168, holds at page
17 3 of the Pacific Reporter:
"The evidence clearly showing that the defendant
had no knowledge of the hole in the trench, or that it
had existed long enough to give the city constructive
notice thereof, and these things under the facts of this
case, being necessary before liability is established,
the motion for an instructed verdict should have been
granted.''
So with the case at bar, the appellant was not aware of
any hazard to vehicular traffic on 13th West Street. The street
is in the outskirts of the city and does not bear the burden
of traffic as streets in the central area or arterial streets, and
therefore the likelihood of the city officials obtaining notice
of such defect would be much less than a defect on an arterial
street or in the business district. See Exhibit P-4.
In the case of Hedden et al v. Town of Bingham Canyon,
Utah, 94 Utah 442, 78 P.2d 637, the Supreme Court held:
"Evidence whether erection of a cement structure
by municipality at side of highway was the cause of
accumulation of ice and snow at the scene of an auto-
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mobile accident in which occupant of automobile lost
her life was insufficient for the jury.
"Evidence whether municipality was negligent in
failing to provide a warning signal due to an alleged
hazard presented on a street which curved at 30 o angle
so as to render municipality liable for death of automobile occupant, sustained when automobile skidded
on ice at the curve was insufficient for the jury."
1\llaloney v. Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 2d 72, 262 P.2d 281,
this court held:

··In an action by pedestrian against city for personal
injuries sustained when section of city sidewalk collapsed, where there was no evidence that defect existed
in sidewalk before the accident took place, which
presented a hazard to those using it sufficient to give
city notice that there was dangerously defective condition which it negligently failed to correct, pedestrian
could not recover."
At page 282 of the Pacific Reporter, this court said:
"In order to support this claim, the evidence must
show that for some period of time before the accident,
the sidewalk which collapsed was in such a condition
that it obviously presented a hazard to those using it
sufficient to give the city notice that there was a dangerously defective condition which it negligently failed
to correct. Only if the evidence will reasonably support
a finding to that effect when construed most favorably
to the appellant can we reverse the judgment of the
trial court. In this respect we think appellant's evidence
fails to support a finding in his favor."
The decision was unanimous. The lower court had directed
a verdict in favor of the respondent city and the plaintiff
appealed.

5
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In the case of Cheney v. City of Los Angeles, 119 C.A.
2d 75, 258 P.2d 1099, at page 1100 ( 3) of the Pacific Reporter,
the California court stated:
"It is likewise settled that before a defendant municipality may be charged with constructive notice it
(the defect) must have existed for a sufficient length
of time and be sufficiently conspicuous or notorious
to give rise to the inference that the defendant had
knowledge thereof."

In the case at bar the defect in the sewer lid had not
existed long enough nor was it conspicuous enough to impute
notice to the appellant city.
In Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233, this
court said:
"Negligence consists in doing or omitting to do any
act which an ordinarily prudent and careful person
under the same circumstances would do or omit to do,
but not in doing or omitting to do an act which can
only be done or prevented by the exercise of extraordinary exertion or care or by the expenditure of
extra-ordinary sums of money."
The accident involved in the case at bar happened in a
sparsely populated area of the city and on a street with comparatively little travel. See Exhibit P4.
In Scoville v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 60, 39 P. 481, page
482, this court said:
"The question of notice is not alone determined
from the length of time a defect has existed, but also
fron1 the nature and character of the defect, the extent
of the travel, and whether it is in a populous or
sparsely settled part of the city."
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In Dahl v. Nelson and the City of Fargo, N. D. Supreme
Court of N.D., January 26, 1953, 56 N.W. 2d 757, it was held
that when an action against driver of automobile by guest
was dismissed, but a judgment of $5,000.00 on jury's verdict
was awarded plaintiff against the city of Fargo for maintaining
an obstruction in the street, that the evidence which showed
that ruts in a muddy street straddled a manhole encasement,
and the auto in driving along said ruts collided with encasement of the sewer manhole injuring guest, that maintenance
in such condition for a period of 24 hours was insufficient
to take to the jury the question of either actual or constructive
notice of the defect. On page 760 ( 5) of the N.W. report
the Supreme Court of North Dakota said:
"In order for the city to have had sufficient notice in
the instant case, it would have been necessary for the
city to have had notice, first, that there was a single
track down the center of the road which straddled the
manhole; and, second that the ruts of the tracks
were of sufficient depth so it should have reasonably been anticipated that they would eventually
become deep enough to make the manhole casing an
obstruction. Notice that the street was wet, had an
unpaved surface and that some ruts might develop of
course could be imputed to the city. From notice of
these facts, however, it cannot be said that the city
officials should have anticipated that the traffic upon
the street would create a single track astride t he
manhole, rather than one track for west bound traffic
north of it and another for east bound traffic south
of it, or that the ruts created by the traffic would
become of dangerous depth. To say that the existence,
for a period of one day, of the ruts astride the manhole, of sufficient depth to make witness Willits consider them dangerous, is sufficient to impute to the
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city notice of a defect, which was potentially but not
certainly dangerous, would be to say that reasonable
maintenance of the city's streets required those charged
with the duty of street maintenance in the city of Fargo
to make a careful inspection of all of the unpaved
streets in all of the outlying districts of the city within
twenty four hours after every rain, taking notice of
the location of ruts, measuring or estimating their
depth and reaching an accurate conclusion as to
whether the ruts might eventually reach a depth which
would become dangerous. In other words, it would
burden a city with the duty of exercising not only the
highest possible degree of care but a degree which
in some instances would be impossible. Such is not the
measure of a city's duty. A city is only required to
exercise reasonable care to discover and remedy defects
in its streets.
"Since as a matter of law, the evidence in this case
is insufficient to establish either actual or constructive
notice of the defect in the street which caused the
injuries suffered by the plaintiff's daughter and there
appears to be no reasonable probability that the deficiencies in the proof can be supplied upon a new
trial, the judgment of the district court against the
city of Fargo is reversed and the case ordered dismissed.''
The case of Colby v. City of Portland, et al., 85 Ore. 359,
166 P. 537, was an action for personal injuries sustained by
the plaintiff on a board walk crosswalk in one of the streets
of Portland. It was testified to by a city employee that the
defect complained of had existed from 3 to 6 weeks; others
testified that the defect had existed open, patent and visible
from 3 weeks to months. A rotten plank in the crosswalk gave
way and plaintiff pushing a baby buggy in front of her, caught

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

her foot in defective plank and fell. She sued the city, mayor,
councilmen and city engineer. Non-suit was granted the city
and the individual defendants appealed. The Oregon Supreme
Court held on page 543 of the Pacific report, paragraph 10:
"Portland contains approximately a quarter of a
million of inhabitants. It appears from the testimony
that something less than a dozen people had noticed
the defect, and that three or four of that number had
casually mentioned it to neighbors, but nobody seemed
to consider the matter serious enough to report to the
authorities. The existence of the defect seems not to
have been known to anybody, except these few persons
living in the immediate neighborhood, and was not
a matter of general public notoriety or concern. The
plaintiff, who resided within a block of the crossing,
testified that she was entirely ignorant of the defect,
and yet it is contended the mayor and commissioners,
with all the multitudinous duties devolving upon them,
should be adjudged to have been negligent, and to pay
the plaintiff $6,350.00, because they did not know of
the existence of the defect in the walk for three weeks,
or perhaps double that time, is no evidence of notice
to the council, Of lack of diligence on their pa'f't in
the discharge of their duties. If one of the principal
bridges in the town should become in such a state of
disrepair as to be a public menace or impede the
public travel, it naturally would become a source of
public concern to many people, and the commissioners
would in the ordinary course of affairs hear of it. If
they were charged with the duty of making a personal
inspection of the walks of the city, and failed to find
a defect which was open and apparent, there might
be some reason for the inference that a defect which
had existed for several weeks should have been discovered and repaired; but in the very nature of things
they can act only through subordinate officers, and
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it is not claimed that any policeman or inspector ever
made any report, and it is evident that no member of
the council ever had any personal knowledge of the
defect. There was no evidence to justify a finding that
the mayor and commissioners were guilty of negligence."
In Smith v. Krebs et al., 166 Kan. 586, 203 P.2d 215, while
the plaintiff was walking on a cement sidewalk in a city street
she stepped on a board which covered an opening in the walk,
the board gave way, she was injured and sued the city and the
abutting lot owner for damages. Under the facts and the
authorities stated in the opinion it is held that neither the
city nor the owner of the abutting lot was liable:
"Its (the city) only duty is to furnish streets and
sidewalks that are reasonably safe and suitable for
the use made of them by the public. Its liability for
injuries to persons which result from defects of the
streets or sidewalks arises by reason of the negligence
of the city in failing to provide streets and sidewalks
which are reasonably safe for use. It is a tort liability
and the general rule is that the city is not negligent
and has no liability for injuries to persons using the
sidewalks resulting from a defect therein unless it has
knowledge or notice of such defect and an opportunity
to repair it.
"In this case it is conceded that the city did not
have knowledge of the defect, and there is no claim
that it was patent. The board the plaintiff stepped on
looked as sound as any of the others. There was nothing
in the appearance of the covering over the hole in the
sidewalk which would cause anyone looking at it to
think it was otherwise than sound.
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''Therefore, under the authority of the cases above
cited, it is clear that no negligence of the city was
shown.'' (Page 217 id.)
There was no patent defect in 13th West Street-plaintiffs
themselves said the street looked fine. (R. 59, line 10; R. 64,
lines 9 and 10; R. 70, lines 9 to 14).
"There is in such instance no fixed or definite rule
as to what length of time a defect must have existed to
furnish notice. Much depends upon the character of
the defect and upon the circumstances and surroundings.'' Williams v. Wessington Twp., 70 S.D. 75, 14
N.W. 2d 493, at page 494.
There was no evidence introduced m the case at bar
to dispute the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses that the
lid had been cracked for approximately one week, but they
failed to notify the city or any of its servants or employees.
There was no further evidence that the lid was originally
defective, or of bad design or did not fit prior to its being
broken. The slight discoloration on the underneath side of
the lid may disclose some evidence of a fracture of longer
duration than a week, but it was not discovered prior to the
break because it was hidden from the inspector's view (R. 143,
lines 14 to 25).
"Injuries resulting from latent defects in a street
not due to faulty municipal work, and which could
not have been discovered by ordinary care and diligence,
do not give right of action against the municipal
corporation in the absence of such notice." C.J.S. Municipal Corporations, Vol. 63, Section 829, page 169.
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II. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE
PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE, BECAUSE IT
OPERATES ITS SEWER SYSTEM IN A GOVERNMENTAL
CAPACITY.
In a recent case, this court held that cities operate their
sewer systems in a governmental capacity, (Cobia vs. Roy City,
Utah, rendered December 8, 1961), and in the particular
case further held, that the defendant city of Roy was not liable
for damage to the plaintiff's property, even though the defendant may have been negligent.
In the case at bar the manhole was maintained for flushing
the sewer; it was a flush tank. (R. 149, lines 17 to 26).
In operating a waterworks system for protection against
fire, for flushing sewers or for other uses pertaining to public
health and safety, a municipal corporation exercises governmental power; C.J.S., Vol. 63, Municipal Corporations, Section
241, page 51. (See R. 159, lines 10 to 25.)
The lid alleged to be defective was a part of the sanitary
sewer system of Salt Lake City and was used as a flush tank
to wash out the sewer approximately once per m o n t h.
The defendant operates its sewer system in a governmental
capacity, and is not, therefore, liable for the alleged personal
injuries and damages resulting from its operation.

CONCLUSION
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the defendant's
motion for non-suit and dismissal (R. 135) or directed verdict
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(R. 167) should have been granted and that in accordance
with the law and the facts of this case and the authorities
herein cited, the defendant is entitled to a judgment; that the
plaintiffs take nothing by their complaint, and th~ case be
remanded to the District Court for Salt Lake County, with
instructions to enter its judgment for defendant and against
the plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,
HOMER HOLMGREN
City Attorney
A. M. MARSDEN
Assistant City Attorney
414 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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